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SPREADING THE CREDIT: VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND  
WEAK EPISTEMIC ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM 
 
University of Edinburgh 
S. Orestis Palermos 
 
 
 
Abstract. Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the 
particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are 
Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony (2008) and Goldberg’s process reliabilist treatment of 
testimonial and coverage-support justification (2010). What seems to be missing from the literature, 
however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter 
anytime this may be the case. Indicatively, even though Lackey (2007) has recently launched an attack 
against the Credit Account of Knowledge (CAK) on the basis of testimony, she has not classified her 
view of testimonial knowledge into any of the alternative, general approaches to knowledge. Similarly, 
even if Goldberg’s attempt to provide a process reliabilist explanation of the social nature of testimonial 
knowledge is deemed satisfactory, his attempt to do the same in the case of coverage-support 
justification does not deliver the requisite result. This paper demonstrates that CAK can in fact provide, 
pace Lackey’s renunciation of the view, a promising account of the social nature of both testimonial and 
coverage-supported knowledge. Additionally, however, it can display further explanatory power by also 
revealing the social nature of knowledge produced on the basis of epistemic artifacts. Despite their 
disparities, all these types of knowledge count as partly social in nature, because in all these cases, 
according to CAK, the epistemic credit for the individual agent’s true belief must spread between the 
individual agent and certain parts of her epistemic community. Accordingly, CAK is a promising 
candidate for providing a unified approach to several and, perhaps all possible, instances of what we may 
call ‘weak epistemic anti-individualism’ within mainstream epistemology: i.e., the claim that the nature 
of knowledge can occasionally be both social and individual at the same time. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the traditionally individualistic approach of the field, mainstream epistemology has 
lately started being increasingly perceptive to the social dimensions of knowledge (Alston, 
2006; Fuller, 2007, 2012; Goldman, 1999, 2004; 2010; Palermos &Pritchard 2013). 
Nevertheless, this shift, or rather widening of focus, raises the following question: How can we 
allow our epistemic inquiries to be socially oriented without abandoning the methodological 
individualism that underlies mainstream epistemology? Or, to put it the other way around, 
how can we pursue mainstream epistemology while accommodating our socio-epistemic 
intuitions?  
 This is a pressing question and, indeed, there have already been some attempts to 
outline such an approach. Each time, however, the focus has only been on the details of the 
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partly social nature of specific types of knowledge, in isolation. Lackey’s dualism in the 
epistemology of testimony (2008) and Goldberg’s case for ‘coverage-support’ (2010)1 are 
perhaps the most noteworthy examples, both of which constitute remarkable attempts to spell 
out the particular ways in which these two types of knowledge are—each in its own way—
partly social. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to 
knowledge that could potentially reveal the partly social nature of knowledge anytime this may 
be the case. In some more detail, even though Lackey (2007) has launched an attack against 
the Credit Account of Knowledge (CAK)—i.e., roughly put, the idea that if S knows that p, 
then S deserves credit for believing truly that p—on the basis of testimony, she does not 
classify her dualism in the epistemology of testimony (2008) into any of the alternative, general 
approaches to knowledge. And even if Goldberg’s (2010) attempt to provide an explanation of 
the social nature of testimonial justification in terms of process reliabilism—according to 
which knowledge is true belief that is the product of a reliable process—is deemed satisfactory, 
his treatment of coverage-supported beliefs does not deliver the requisite result of ‘socializing’ 
coverage-support justification. In other words, a general account that could bring to the fore 
possibly all the ways in which knowledge might be partly social is yet to be disclosed.  
 The aim of this paper is to rectify this. Specifically, it will be argued that we can arrive 
at such an account by elaborating—pace Lackey’s renunciation of the view—on a virtue 
reliabilist version of CAK.2 As we shall see, despite its orthodox pedigree, CAK—with its 
focus on the attribution of epistemic credit—is particularly apt for unraveling the exogenous, 
social nature of several distinct types of knowledge-acquisition:  It can provide a promising 
account of the social nature of both testimonial and coverage-supported knowledge, but it can 
display additional explanatory power by also revealing the social nature of knowledge 
produced on the basis of epistemic artifacts (in fact, accommodating this type of knowledge 
may be thought to be quite a demanding test for virtue reliabilism, though, as we shall see, not 
an insurmountable one): In all these cases, according to CAK, the cognitive success may 
indeed be creditable to the cognitive agency of the individual subject whose knowledge status 
is being assessed, but only to a limited degree; the rest of the credit should, or so the argument 
will go, be attributed to other specific individuals, or to the epistemic society that the 
individual subject is embedded in. Accordingly, CAK can provide a unified approach to 
several and perhaps all cases of what we may call ‘weak epistemic anti-individualism’ within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 That is, the interesting observation that, on many occasions, we can come to know that p, because if not-p were 
the case we would have heard about it by now (by means of the informational channels provided by our 
community). 
2 The Credit Account of Knowledge, as it will be here considered, is similar to what Lackey (2007) calls the  
‘Deserving Credit View of Knowledge’. The only difference is that the former, contrary to the latter, is agnostic as 
to whether the credit S deserves for truly believing that p in cases of knowledge accounts for the additional value of 
knowledge over mere true belief. In other words, while the Credit Account of Knowledge claims that knowledge is 
creditable true belief, it says nothing about whether the relevant credit is of positive, negative or merely neutral 
value.   
	   3	  
mainstream epistemology: i.e., the claim that the nature of knowledge can occasionally be 
both social and individual at the same time. 
One important caveat is in order, however. The point here won’t be that knowledge 
might, in certain cases, be entirely social—i.e., the objective is not to argue for the possibility of 
strong epistemic anti-individualism within mainstream epistemology. In order to make this clear we 
need to examine Hardwig’s claim (Hardwig, 1985) that the sort of epistemic dependence 
exhibited in cases like the ones mentioned above leads to either of the following two, 
seemingly unpalatable conclusions: 1) Either we must reject the individualist idea that in order 
to know one needs to be intellectually autonomous in possessing evidence (such as sound 
arguments and factual information) for the truth of what one knows; or 2) accept that such 
knowledge is not possessed by any individual alone, but by the epistemic community as a 
whole.3 As we shall see, the present approach is an attempt to avoid the second option while 
explaining how it is possible to retain the first, but in a way that preserves the methodological 
individualism that underlies mainstream epistemology.  
 
2. THE CREDIT ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE 
Before we turn to any of the specific ways in which knowledge can be partly social in nature, it 
is important to first introduce the general approach to knowledge that we will be here focusing 
on and against the background of which the most specific social aspects of knowledge will be 
later accounted for. The Credit Account of Knowledge (CAK), as captured by virtue 
reliabilism,4 can be defined as the combination of the following two intuitions: 1) The ability 
intuition on knowledge—i.e., the idea that knowledge is belief that is true in virtue of the 
manifestation of cognitive ability;5 and 2) the intuition that credit is rightfully attributed only in 
cases of success through ability. Specifically, according to CAK, knowledge—or, at least, a 
necessary aspect of it—is creditable true belief (Greco, 2007, p. 57), which is creditable to a 
specific individual S, because, not only is it a belief that is true, but it is true in virtue of the 
manifestation of S’s cognitive ability.6  
 On this view, cognitive ability is understood as a reliable belief-forming process that 
has been appropriately integrated into the agent’s cognitive character, where the agent’s 
cognitive character mainly consists of the agent’s cognitive faculties of the brain/central 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hardwig (1985), in other words, hints towards strong epistemic anti-individualism. Likewise, Kusch (2002)—
motivated partly by considerations similar to those of Hardwig—has put forward a communitarian epistemology. 
Hardwig’s arguments, however, as we will argue later on, are not sufficient for properly motivating strong 
epistemic anti-individualism.  And, while there is no doubt that Kusch’s view is strongly anti-individualistic, his 
communitarian epistemology is rather alienated from mainstream epistemology such that juxtaposing it with what 
we here call weak epistemic anti-individualism—in mainstream epistemology—would be considerably misleading.    
4 So far the Credit Account of Knowledge has only been spelled out in terms of (specific versions) of virtue 
reliabilism. In principle, however, there is no reason to think it is incompatible with any of the existing alternatives. 
5 For some defenses of this intuition, see (Greco, 1999, 2003, 2007; Plantinga, 1993; Pritchard, 2006, 2010a, 
2010b, 2012; Sosa, 2007, 2011, 1988, 1991). 
6 According to Greco (1999, 2003, 2010), “in virtue of” should be here understood in causal explanatory terms. 
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nervous system (CNS), including her natural perceptual faculties, memory, and the overall 
doxastic system. In addition, however, it can also consist of “acquired skills of perception and 
acquired methods of inquiry including those involving highly specialized training or even 
advanced technology” (Greco, 1999, p. 287). Here is a relatively weak formulation of virtue 
reliabilism we can work with: 
 
COGAweak  7 
 
If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming process, 
which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her cognitive success 
is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency (Pritchard, 2010a, p. 136-7). 
 
What is the reason virtue reliabilists turn to an account of knowledge that stresses the 
creditable nature of the cognitive success (i.e., the true belief) as well as its origin in the agent’s 
cognitive ability? Mainly, the knowledge-undermining luck involved in Gettier cases. As 
Gettier demonstrated, one’s justified belief may turn out to be true without thereby counting 
as an instance of knowledge.  In the typical scenario, one’s belief, which is the product of a 
faulty justificatory process, just happens to be true for reasons that are extraneous to one’s 
justification: In a lucky turn of events, one’s belief, which would otherwise be false (given it is 
produced in a defective way), turns out to be true. Contrast this with cases of success through 
the manifestation of ability. “There is a sense of ‘luck’ on which lucky success is precisely 
opposed to success through virtue or ability” (Greco 2007, 58). When one’s true belief is the 
product of the manifestation of one’s ability then believing the truth cannot have been lucky. 
Of course, one may still be lucky to believe anything at all (because, say, one could have easily 
been killed), but believing the truth is not lucky itself. Accordingly, and since credit is normally 
attributed in cases of success through ability, virtue reliabilists hold that when some agent 
knows, his belief must be true because of his cognitive ability, such that the cognitive success be, 
more or less,8 creditable to him.  
 Moreover, and before we can leave CAK temporarily to the side, it will be helpful to 
settle one more question: According to virtue reliabilism, in order for a belief-forming process 
to count as a cognitive ability it must be part of the agent’s cognitive character. Accordingly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 COGAweak stands for Weak COGnitive Agency. Despite the name, this is a particularly promising formulation of 
virtue reliabilism that is able to accommodate most (if not all) of the problems facing its alternatives. For extensive 
defenses, see (Pritchard 2010a, 2012; Palermos 2011a, 2014a, forthcoming. In fact, the only reasons it is supposed to 
be a ‘weak’ formulation of virtue reliabilism are technical ones: Firstly, it is a necessary (rather than both a 
necessary and sufficient) condition on knowledge: Several epistemologists hold that virtue reliabilism is a necessary 
component, but to have an adequate theory of knowledge, they argue, it must be further supplemented by either 
the safety or the sensitivity principle (see also fn. 15). For such an example, see (Pritchard 2012). Secondly, for 
reasons to be discussed in §3.1, notice that COGAweak requires that one’s cognitive success be significantly, as 
opposed to primarily, creditable to one’s cognitive agency. 
8 As we shall see later on, there is disagreement on the extent to which one’s true belief should be creditable to one. 
For example, Lackey (2007)—an opponent of the view—argues that Greco’s Agent Reliabilism (1999, 2010) must 
be understood as requiring that one’s cognitive success be primarily creditable to one’s self. In contrast, Pritchard’s 
COGAweak demands that it only be significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency. 
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an important question to ask is what could it be required in order for a process to be so 
integrated? As far as common-sense intuitions are concerned, Greco (1999, 2010) has noted 
that the relevant belief-forming process must be neither strange nor fleeting (i.e., it must be a 
normal, dispositional cognitive process).9 Despite such broad intuitions, however, Greco has 
noted in later work (2010) that in order for a process to be appropriately integrated within 
one’s cognitive character it must interact cooperatively with it. Specifically he writes: 
“cognitive integration is a function of cooperation and interaction, or cooperative interaction 
with other aspects of the cognitive system” (2010, p. 152). 
 
3. THE DUAL NATURE OF TESTIMONIAL AND COVERAGE-
SUPPORTED KNOWLEDGE 
While keeping the above in mind, it is now interesting to examine the existing attempts to 
construe certain types of knowledge as both social and individual. Specifically, the focus will 
be on Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s process reliabilist 
treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. All of these accounts constitute 
remarkably insightful attempts to accentuate the epistemic distribution of labor that takes 
place in these specific types of knowledge. Nevertheless, they fall short of providing a general 
approach to knowledge; one that can reveal the sense in which the nature of knowledge is 
partly social in several, and hopefully,  all instances whereby this may be the case.  In 
particular, even though Lackey rejects CAK on the basis of considerations having to do with 
testimonial knowledge, she does not classify her view under any of the existing alternative, 
general approaches to knowledge, and even if one accepts Goldberg’s process reliabilist 
explanation of the social nature of testimonial knowledge, his attempt to ‘socialize’ the 
justification of coverage-supported beliefs is not likely to be equally convincing. The aims of 
this section are (1) to critically examine the insights provided by the aforementioned attempts 
to reveal the particular ways in which these specific aspects of knowledge are social in nature 
and (2) to demonstrate that, despite Lackey’s renunciation of the view, CAK—with its focus 
on the attribution of epistemic credit—can in fact prove particularly helpful in 
accommodating and spelling out the social aspects of both testimonial and coverage-
supported justification. 
 If this section is successful in demonstrating the above, the effect will be that CAK will 
start figuring as a strong candidate for providing a general approach to knowledge—one that 
can account for all known, and perhaps all possible, ways in which knowledge may be partly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The reason why a belief-forming process must be integrated to the agent’s cognitive character has to do with 
epistemic responsibility/subjective justification. For a detailed discussion of subjective justification/epistemic 
responsibility in terms of cognitive integration as well as in terms of the above (common-sense) intuitions, see 
Palermos 2014a. 
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social in nature. Subsequently, the following section (§4) will seek to corroborate this 
expectation of theoretical progress by demonstrating how CAK can also reveal the social 
nature of knowledge produced on the basis of epistemic artifacts.  
 
 3.1 Testimonial Knowledge 
Testimonial knowledge has always been a central topic in epistemology. The reason is simple: 
Very many of our everyday beliefs appear to have testimonial origins. Accordingly, any 
adequate account of knowledge should be able to accommodate this powerful source of 
knowledge.  
 Traditionally, the two opposing sides within the debate concerning testimonial 
knowledge are those of reductionism, which assigns the entire epistemic burden to the hearer, 
and non-reductionism, which shifts the epistemic burden to the speaker.10 In some more 
detail, reductionists ascribe to the ‘positive reasons’ thesis, according to which, justification or 
warrant is attached to testimonial beliefs only by the presence of appropriate positive reasons 
that depend on sense perception, memory and inductive inference. Testimonial justification 
or warrant is therefore ultimately reducible to the justification/warrant of these basic 
epistemic sources.11 On the contrary, according to non-reductionism, testimony is as 
epistemically basic as sense perception, memory and inductive inference. Therefore, acquiring 
testimonial knowledge does not require the possession of any positive reasons on the part of 
the hearer but only the absence of any negative ones: So long as there are no relevant 
undefeated defeaters,12 hearers can acquire testimonially based knowledge merely on the basis 
of a speaker’s report.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Goldberg and Henderson (2006), however, argue that it is possible to stick to the letter of non-reductionism, 
while still assigning some of the epistemic burden to the hearer—in the form of a subconscious, monitoring-for-
reliability condition.  
11 Hume (2011) is often regarded (quite possibly unjustly) as the best-known supporter of reductionism regarding 
the epistemology of testimony. Amongst contemporary supporters of the view is Faulkner (2000, pp. 587–8) who 
claims that “it is doxastically irresponsible to accept testimony without some background belief in the testimony's 
credibility or truth”, and that “an audience is justified in forming a testimonial belief if and only if he is justified in 
accepting the speaker's testimony.” Similarly, Fricker (1994, pp. 149–50) claims that “the hearer should be 
discriminating in her attitude to the speaker, in that she should be continually evaluating him for trustworthiness 
throughout their exchange, in the light of the evidence, or cues, available to her.” 
12 Following Lackey (2008), there are two relevant types of defeaters that could affect one’s acquisition of 
testimonial knowledge. First, there are psychological defeaters, which are beliefs or doubts that are had by the 
hearer and which indicate that the hearer’s beliefs are either false or unreliably formed. Notice that psychological 
defeaters may not be objectively correct. Second, there are normative defeaters, which are doubts or beliefs that 
the hearer ought to have, and which indicate that the hearer’s beliefs are either false or unreliably formed. In other 
words, normative defeaters are beliefs or doubts that the hearer should have (despite whether or not the hearer 
does actually have them), given the presence of certain available evidence.   
13 Non-reductionism is traditionally associated with the work of Reid (1786). Some contemporary proponents of 
the view are Burge (1986, p. 47): “a person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and is 
intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so”; Weiner (2003, p. 57): “we are justified in 
accepting anything that we are told unless there is positive evidence against doing so”; and Audi (1998, p. 142): 
“gaining testimonially grounded knowledge normally requires only having no reason for doubt about the 
credibility of the attester.” 
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 In any case, however, regardless of whether one is a reductionist or a non-
reductionist, there is no doubt that the speaker does play at least some role in the testimonial 
exchange, and this is a claim we need to examine in far closer detail for the following two 
reasons. Firstly, it renders testimonial knowledge the perfect candidate for a type of knowledge 
that is partly social in nature. Secondly, it is this particular, social aspect of testimonial 
knowledge that Lackey has exploited (2007) in order to argue against CAK. Accordingly, before 
we can continue we need to first put this worry to rest.  
To appreciate Lackey’s objection, consider the following example: 
 
Jenny14 
  
Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar city and asks the first person that she meets for 
directions. The person that she asks is indeed knowledgeable about the area, and gives her 
directions. Jenny believes what she is told and goes on her way to her intended destination.  
 
Obviously, unless we want to deny a great amount of knowledge that we suppose we have, we 
must admit that Jenny can gain knowledge in this way. On the basis of this thought 
experiment, however, Lackey (2007) has argued that, apparently, given the way Jenny gains 
knowledge, her cognitive character does not have much to do with her true belief. Instead, it 
is the informant’s cognitive character that figures most importantly in the explanation of how 
Jenny believes the truth.  
While this remark may initially sound harmless, Lackey argues that, if true, it is 
actually very problematic for proponents of CAK. This is because, if they want to account for 
testimonial knowledge in a way that will accommodate the Jenny case, they must loosen their 
demands by requiring that the agent’s cognitive success of believing the truth only be 
significantly (as opposed to primarily) creditable to the agent’s cognitive agency. By doing so, 
however, virtue reliabilists run the risk of rendering their view impotent with respect to the 
problem it was initially called to resolve. Remember that virtue reliabilists turn to an account 
of knowledge that stresses the creditable nature of the cognitive success precisely in order to 
do away with the knowledge-undermining luck involved in Gettier cases. If, however, in order 
to accommodate testimonial knowledge, virtue reliabilists demand only a weak—as opposed 
to strong—degree of creditability, they run the risk of loosing their grip on the problem posed 
by Gettier: Even though the agent’s belief is only luckily true in Gettier cases, he still deserves 
credit for employing his cognitive ability in order to believe something—no matter whether it 
is true or false—as opposed to nothing at all. Accordingly, it seems that on a weak version of 
CAK, victims of Gettier cases incorrectly count as knowing. 
This may sound worrisome for COGAweak, which does indeed demand that the 
cognitive success be only significantly creditable to the agent’s cognitive agency. But if we pay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 (Pritchard, 2009, p. 68). It is adapted from Lackey’s ‘Morris case’ (see Lackey, 2007, p. 352) 
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attention to the details of what we have said so far, we will see that it is actually not worrying 
at all. First, remember that COGAweak is only a necessary condition on knowledge that may as 
well be supplemented with an anti-luck condition in order to account for Gettier cases.15 But 
even if we don’t want to supplement COGAweak with any such modal principle, but we want, 
instead, to treat it as a full account of knowledge, we can still avoid the problem laid out 
above. This is because, as Greco (2010) has pointed out, virtue reliabilism (COGAweak 
included) does not merely require that one believe in virtue of cognitive ability and that one’s 
belief happen to be true. Instead, virtue reliabilism, properly understood, requires that one’s 
belief be true in virtue of cognitive ability—a crucial qualification that allows virtue reliabilists to 
deal with Gettier cases without necessarily requiring that the cognitive success be primarily 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency. To wit, so long as we demand that one believes the truth 
in virtue of one’s cognitive character—as opposed to merely demanding that one’s belief be 
true independently of how one arrived at it—we can do away with knowledge undermining luck 
(in the sense operating in Gettier cases), without worrying ourselves with whether the 
cognitive success may only be significantly, as opposed to primarily, creditable to one. 
Accordingly, in principle, virtue reliabilists can also account for testimonial knowledge, no 
matter that, in such cases, the credit for the hearer’s cognitive success is not predominantly 
down to her.16 Therefore, virtue reliabilism, in general, and COGAweak, in particular, are well 
positioned to avoid Lackey’s worries with respect to the dilemma posed by Gettier cases and 
testimonial knowledge.        
And in fact, as we are about to see, Lackey (2008) has recently offered a detailed 
account of testimonial knowledge that—despite her previous attack to CAK—is quite in line 
with COGAweak. Of course, this is an interesting observation on its own, but unpacking here 
Lackey’s account in terms of COGAweak can also reveal how CAK is well positioned to spell 
out the distribution of epistemic burden that takes place in cases of testimonial knowledge—a 
first, yet significant step towards demonstrating that CAK can provide a unified approach to 
possibly every instance of weak epistemic anti-individualism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Consider for example Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: S knows that p if and only if S’s safe belief that p is the product of her 
relevant cognitive abilities (such that her safe cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency) (Pritchard, 
2012). Again, in (Pritchard 2010b, p. 76) we read: “ knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive 
traits that make up one’s cognitive character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable 
to one’s cognitive character”. The sensitivity principle is usually formulated as follows: If S knows that p, then S’s true 
belief that p, is such that, had p been false, S would not have believed p. The classic defenses of the sensitivity 
principle can be found in Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981). The safety principle is usually understood thusly: if S 
knows that p, then S’s true belief that p, is such that S’s belief that p could not have easily been false. For recent 
defenses of the safety principle see Sosa (1999, 2000) and Pritchard (2002, 2008). For a very good discussion 
concerning the relation between the ability and the anti-luck intuition on knowledge see Pritchard (2012). 
16 In cases of testimonial knowledge, for example, it may be argued (as we shall see below) that even though the 
hearer’s cognitive success is not primarily creditable to her (since at least a significant part of the credit must also go 
to the speaker for delivering a reliable report), the hearer’s belief is still true in virtue of the hearer’s cognitive 
abilities: It is on the basis of these abilities that the hearer spots an appropriate informant, rationally accepts the 
offered true report, and thereby ends up with the truth.  
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To start with, the first thing we need to note is that, contrary to reductionism that 
puts all of the epistemic responsibility on the hearer and non-reductionism that assigns at least 
the lion’s share—if not the entirety—of the epistemic work to the speaker, the main idea that 
motivates Lackey’s dualist account is that it “takes two to tango”: “[A]n adequate view of 
testimonial justification or warrant needs to recognize that the justification or warrant of a 
hearer’s belief has dual sources being grounded in both the reliability of the speaker and the 
rationality of the hearer’s reason for belief” (Lackey, 2008, p. 177). Accordingly, Lackey 
formulates her account this way: 
 
Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony 
 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p on the 
basis of A’s testimony only if: 
(D1)  B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony; 
(D2)  A’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth conducive; 
(D3)  B is a reliable or properly working recipient of testimony;    
(D4)  The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable for the 
reception of reliable testimony; 
(D5)  B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s 
testimony; 
(D6)  B has appropriate positive reasons for accepting A’s testimony. (Lackey, 
2008, pp. 177-8) 
 
Now, before explaining how COGAweak can accommodate Lackey’s dualism on testimonial 
knowledge, we should make clear that the former can (easily) handle the Jenny case: Although 
the cognitive success is not primarily creditable to Jenny—but instead a significant part of the 
credit goes to the stranger—Jenny, by being responsive to epistemically relevant factors (for 
example, to epistemically reliable contexts and contextual figures, reliable classes of report 
and reliable speakers)17 has the right sort of abilities and employs them in the right sort of way 
so as to deserve significant credit for accepting the stranger’s report. After all, she wouldn’t 
believe someone who is obviously drunk or evasive and she wouldn’t accept the suggestion to 
go past the city hall while she is obviously in a village. Therefore, according to COGAweak, 
Jenny can gain knowledge in this way.  
Should we then be confident that COGAweak is in agreement with Lackey’s dualist 
account? And more importantly to the purpose of this paper, can it accommodate the 
distribution of the epistemic burden that Lackey’s account brings to light? Putting aside 
conditions D1 and D4, which are only meant to ensure that B comes to believe p on the basis 
of A’s testimonial report (D1) and that there is nothing tricky in the environment the 
testimonial exchange takes place (D4), it is important to see whether COGAweak can 
encompass conditions D2, D3, D5 and D6. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For more details on the types of inductively based positive reasons that could allow normal subjects to identify 
reliable (or unreliable) testimonial reports, see Lackey (2008, 182-3). 
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Consider, first, conditions D3, D5 and D6, according to which the hearer must: (D3) 
be a reliable or properly working recipient of testimony; (D5) have no undefeated defeaters for 
the speaker’s testimony; and (D6) have appropriate reasons for the speaker’s testimony. The 
incentive for discussing these three conditions together is that they are jointly meant to ensure 
the rational or at least, not irrational, acceptance of the speaker’s report. Moreover, notice 
that the absence of any undefeated defeaters against and the possession of positive reasons for 
a testimonial report—all the while the agent is a proper recipient of testimony in that had he 
had any negative or positive reasons in mind he would respond appropriately—18can be 
thought of as the two sides of the same coin. Specifically, both conditions require that one be 
aware of, able and expected to detect any such reasons, should they become evidentially 
available. The only difference is that in order to acquire testimonial knowledge, no undefeated 
defeaters must remain in the end, while positive reasons must have been acquired. 
Importantly, however, both conditions require a fairly active stance on the part of the hearer 
in the sense that she must be on a continuous lookout—even if subconsciously so—for 
satisfying them.19 Satisfaction of D3, D5 and D6 therefore ensures that acquiring a true belief 
on the basis of a speaker’s report will at least be significantly creditable to the hearer’s 
cognitive agency, such that, according to COGAweak, her testimonially derived true belief will 
amount to knowledge. 
This leaves us with condition D2, which is the only condition that pertains to the 
speaker: The speaker’s testimony must be reliable or otherwise truth-conducive. First, we 
should here concentrate on the epistemic burden distribution entailed by D2. As previously 
noted, Lackey’s dualism, contrary to reductionism and non-reductionism that only focus on 
the hearer or the speaker, distributes the epistemic burden across both parties of the 
testimonial exchange. So how can COGAweak account for the dual origins of the epistemic 
justification/warrant? 
Remember that according to COGAweak, knowledge can be attributed to S only if the 
cognitive success of believing the truth can be significantly credited to S’s cognitive agency. 
Crucially, however, COGAweak denies that the cognitive success must be wholly attributed to 
the hearer’s cognitive agency, thereby allowing, in cases of testimonial knowledge, for the rest 
of the credit to be, at least in part, attributed to the speaker’s epistemic effort. We can go back 
to the Jenny case to see how this works in practice: It is not that Jenny’s cognitive character 
has nothing to do with her believing the truth; it is just that the informant’s cognitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For more details on D3, see (Lackey, 2008, ch. 7) and (Palermos 2011b). 
19 For an excellent account of how an agent can satisfy conditions D5 and D6 in a critical yet unreflective (i.e. 
subconscious) “snooze” mode, see Fricker (2007) (especially ch. 3). To the contrary, Sieber (2012) argues that 
evidence from social psychology suggests that we should be skeptical about our abilities to be sensitive either to the 
trustworthiness or to the deceptiveness of our interlocutors. Still, however, satisfaction of D5 and D6 does not seem 
to hinge merely on the perceived trustworthiness of the speaker, but also on the reliability of the offered report 
itself, which depends or several other epistemic factors, such as understanding, plausibility, consistence, coherence 
and so on.    
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character is also important. In some more detail, a significant part of the credit can indeed be 
attributed to Jenny’s cognitive agency for employing the right sort of belief-forming processes 
so as to detect an appropriate speaker and rationally accept her words on the basis of positive 
reasons and the lack of any negative ones with respect to the offered report. At the same time, 
however, the rest of the credit can be, at least in part, attributed to the speaker’s cognitive 
agency for delivering a reliable report on the basis of which Jenny forms her true belief. 
COGAweak, therefore, can accommodate the very essence of Lackey’s dualism in the 
epistemology of testimony—i.e., the distribution of the epistemic credit across both the 
speaker and the hearer: The hearer deserves a significant amount of the epistemic credit for 
detecting an appropriate informant and rationally accepting her report, whereas the relevant 
speaker can be credited with delivering a reliable or otherwise truth-conducive statement that 
shapes the content of the hearer’s true belief.20   
Overall then, even though Lackey has argued that testimonial knowledge appears to 
pose a problem for CAK as captured by virtue reliabilism, we see that a virtue reliabilist 
condition on knowledge, viz., COGAweak, can accommodate Lackey’s own account of 
testimonial knowledge—admittedly one of the most promising and detailed accounts on 
offer.21 For the purposes of the present discussion, however, what is distinctive of Lackey’s 
account is that it explicitly points out the dual sources of testimonial justification. That is, 
testimonial justification is not fully reducible to the hearer’s reasons for detecting an 
appropriate speaker and rationally accepting her report. Instead, it also supervenes on the 
reliability of the speaker’s report. Remarkably, COGAweak, which captures at least a necessary 
aspect of knowledge, allows the hearer to acquire knowledge, because the cognitive success 
can be significantly creditable to her cognitive agency. At the same time, however, it allows 
for the rest of the credit to be attributed to the speaker for offering a reliable report. 
Accordingly, COGAweak has the resources to do justice to Lackey’s insight regarding the 
distribution of epistemic burden that takes place in cases of testimonial knowledge. And since 
knowledge is here understood as creditable true believing and credit must be attributed to both 
parties of a testimonial exchange, testimony appears to provide a first instance of weak 
epistemic anti-individualism within mainstream epistemology: i.e., the claim that knowledge 
can occasionally be both social and individual in nature.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Sosa (2007) too has attempted to spell out the social nature of testimonial knowledge in CAK terms, by arguing 
that “testimonial knowledge can [...] take the form of a belief whose correctness is attributable to a complex social 
competence only partially seated in that individual believer” (97). Nevertheless, Sosa further notes, such belief may 
still count as knowledge, “despite how little of the credit for the belief’s correctness may belong to the believer 
individually” (97). In contrast to Sosa’s assessment of testimonial knowledge, the point here is that, in cases of 
testimonial knowledge, the hearer does not deserve little but significant part of the epistemic credit, because it is the 
hearer that is responsible for believing truly, by having detected an appropriate informant and having rationally 
accepted the offered report. Though, admittedly, a significant part of the credit must again go to the speaker for 
having delivered a reliable report that shapes the content of the hearer’s belief, and in the absence of which the 
hearer would have to remain agnostic about the relevant matter. See also fn. 28. 
21 For more details on how COGAweak can accommodate Lackey’s dualist account see Palermos 2011b.  
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3.2 Epistemic Coverage Support 
In his recent book, Goldberg (2010) appears to share Lackey’s insight with respect to the 
epistemic burden distribution that occurs in cases of testimonial knowledge. In fact, in order 
to accentuate the speaker’s involvement in the production of a reliable testimonial belief, he 
goes so far as to claim that the belief-forming process that produces the hearer’s justified true 
belief is a single belief-forming process that supervenes on both the hearer and the speaker’s 
cognitive sub-processes: “far from being merely local features of the subject's environment, the 
testimony itself, along with the cognitive processes implicated in the production of that 
testimony, are more appropriately regarded as part of the testimonial belief-forming process itself. Call 
this the ‘extendedness hypothesis’” (2010, p. 79).22  
 In some more detail, and to familiarize with Goldberg’s terms, his argument follows a 
Goldman-style Process (Historical) Reliabilism (1979), according to which, in order for a belief 
p to be reliable, it is not enough that the final phase of the process that leads to p be reliable; it 
is also necessary that the entire history of the process be reliable. For instance, in cases of 
belief-dependent, belief-forming processes like memory—where the input to the process of 
recollection is a belief that has been encoded at some point in the past—the reliability of the 
final, recollected belief does not only depend on the reliability of the process of recollection. 
Instead, it also rests on the reliability of the initial process of storing the original belief.  
Moreover, early on in his book, Goldberg makes a point about distinguishing between 
what he calls local and global reliability (2010, p. 12): On one hand, a process is globally 
reliable (G-reliable) if it produces, or would produce, a preponderance of true over false 
beliefs, when employed in circumstances similar to the ones it is standardly used. On the other 
hand, a process is locally reliable if it produces, or would produce, a preponderance of true 
over false beliefs in circumstances that are relevantly similar to the ones it is being currently 
used.   
Accordingly, as Goldberg further notes on the basis of the above distinction, a true 
belief will count as known if is both globally and locally reliable, but in order for it to count as 
doxastically justified, it only needs to be globally reliable (bid., p. 159). This is the reason why—
and since he is not committed to virtue- but only to process-reliabilism as an account of 
doxastic justification—Goldberg attempts to unravel the partly social nature of testimonial 
beliefs by specifically ‘socializing’ testimonial (G-) reliability. Testimony is a ‘quasi-belief 
dependent’, belief-forming process, whose overall reliability is a function of the reliability of its 
input which, in turn, depends on the reliability of the cognitive processes that go on in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Notice that Goldberg does not make his claim on the basis of the extended cognition hypothesis (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008) . Rather, Goldberg holds that testimony is a belief-forming process that epistemically 
“extends” to the cognitive capacities of the speaker. For Goldberg’s disavowal of the hypothesis of extended 
cognition, see (2010, ch. 5).  
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speaker’s head. Accordingly, “doxastic justification [i.e., G-reliability] of a testimonial belief 
depends [also] on the reliability of the relevant cognitive processes in the hearer’s informant” 
(ibid., p. 81). 23    
 There is no doubt that Goldberg’s account of testimonial knowledge is very 
interesting indeed, and despite any possible shortcomings,24 it does remarkably well in 
exposing the social dimensions of testimonial knowledge in process reliabilist terms. There is, 
however, no need to further dwell on its details here, as the aim of this section is to focus on 
another very interesting epistemological phenomenon, which, even though it is somewhat 
related to testimony (or, rather, the lack thereof), it is not, as Goldberg himself notes, an 
instance of his “extendedness hypothesis”. I am referring to the ‘coverage-reliability’ of one’s 
community—an  epistemic phenomenon that is nowadays increasingly effective due to the 
widespread use of information media such as the printed press, TV, radio and, most 
importantly, the World Wide Web.  
 To illustrate Goldberg’s point, consider that you know that there is no World-War 
taking place at the moment, that none of your colleagues was fired in the past few days 
(especially since it was only yesterday that you saw Jim the gossipmonger), that there are no 
protests taking place at the city center right now (as you’ve had the radio on for the last 20 
minutes and there has been no relevant report), that Messi has not signed a contract with Real 
Madrid (nothing remotely related to this was mentioned last night during the sport news) and 
that Madonna, this morning, was still alive (your daughter, who avidly follows her on twitter, 
looked perfectly fine during breakfast) . One of the underlying reasons for all these instances of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For a process reliabilist account of testimonial knowledge that is very similar to Goldberg’s (2010), see Shieber 
(2013). Michaelian (2014) is also very sympathetic to Goldberg’s process reliabilist account, though he attempts to 
radicalize Goldberg’s extendedness hypothesis, in order to also apply in cases where the reliability of one’s beliefs 
does not only rest on the reliability of other agents but on the reliability of artifacts as well. This may count as an 
improvement on Goldberg’s view, but it will also inherit the problems that Goldberg’s process reliabilism faces 
with respect to coverage-support (to which we are about to turn).  Interestingly, in his (2009), Goldberg puts 
forward a predecessor to his (2010) argument not on the basis of process reliabilism, but on the basis of virtue 
reliabilism. Even there, however, Goldberg avoids associating virtue reliabilism with the attribution of epistemic 
credit, thereby distancing himself from CAK. Finally, following, Goldberg’s analysis of the cognitive processes that 
testimonial justification relies on, Green (2012) has attempted to provide an idiosyncratic credit account of 
knowledge that is specifically designed to account for testimonial knowledge: “CREDIT FOR US: If x knows that 
p, then the abilities that contribute to the formation and sustenance of x’s belief that p deserve primary credit (or 
something close to it) for x knowing p whether those abilities are contributed solely by x or also by other agents” (125). However 
appealing, one worry is that this is an ad hoc account that is motivated by and crafted to accommodate solely 
considerations pertaining to testimonial knowledge. Other than that, however, the main problem with Green’s 
account, and why we here need to opt for the traditional approach to CAK instead, is that, by failing to tightly tie 
the agent’s cognitive success (i.e., believing the truth of the matter) to the agent’s ability, it allows for testimonial 
knowledge whereby the hearer has done nothing to ensure the reliability of the speaker’s report: No one would 
count me as knowledgeable if Peter Higgs suddenly gave me an anonymous call to report the existence of the Higgs 
Boson (about which I don’t have the foggiest idea), even though, in such a case, credit for my cognitive success 
could in principle be attributed to both of us.      
24 One possible worry about Goldberg’s account is that it may lead to counterintuitive results with respect to 
epistemic responsibility. Specifically, it is intuitive to think that there is a close correlation between doxastic 
justification and epistemic responsibility, such that the absence of the former entails the absence of the latter. In 
cases where the reliability of the speaker’s—but not the hearer’s—testimony-related processes are defective, 
however, Goldberg’s account rules that the hearer’s belief is doxastically unjustified all the while there being 
nothing epistemically culpable about the hearer himself. This appears to be a significant worry that needs to be 
clearly addressed before the ‘extendedness’ hypothesis can get off the ground. 
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knowledge, Goldberg claims, is that if any of those beliefs were true, you would have heard about it by 
now.  Call the italicized conditional the ‘true-to-testimony conditional’ (TTTC).  
 In some more detail, coverage-supported beliefs are a “species of inferential belief, 
where one of the premises involved is none other than (something like) the truth-to-testimony 
conditional itself” (Goldberg, 2010, p. 174). Specifically, a subject’s coverage supported belief 
that p is justified by her current belief that she has no memory of having been informed that 
not-p, together with her belief in the relevant instance of the truth-to-testimony conditional. Of 
course, there will also be relevant inferences that will not hold. Accordingly, Goldberg (2010, 
pp. 158-164) provides the following set of five conditions that he deems jointly sufficient for a 
subject’s coverage-supported beliefs to count as knowledge: 
 
i) Source existence condition: there must be some subgroup of members of the hearer's 
community—we will call this group “the source”—who are disposed to report about the 
relevant sort of matters. 
ii) Reliable coverage condition: the relied-upon source must be reliable in uncovering and 
subsequently publicizing truths about the domain in which the subject is exhibiting 
coverage-reliance. 
iii) Sufficient interval condition: there must be some sort of coordination between the time-related 
expectations of [the hearer], on the one hand, and the abilities of [the source] to make 
any relevant discoveries, on the other. 
iv) Silence Condition: in point of fact, H has not encountered any relevant report to date. 
v) Receptivity Condition: H must be such that she would come across whatever relevant reports 
were offered by the source(s) on whom she was relying, were one to be made. 
 
Now, letting the details aside, the above conditions should be relevantly uncontroversial; 
coverage-supported knowledge does exist, and it most likely behaves in ways very close to 
what Goldberg’s innovative account suggests.  
 Goldberg’s analysis, however, appears to face some serious problems when he 
attempts to account for the social nature of coverage support justification. As mentioned 
above, Goldberg avoids accounting for coverage-supported beliefs in terms of his 
‘extendedness hypothesis’, primarily because, in such cases, the agent’s environment does not 
contribute any input to the agent’s belief-forming process. Granted, just like testimony, 
coverage-supported beliefs, on Goldberg’s construal, may still count as the product of belief-
dependent, inferential processes: “The relevant inference would be from the subject's currently 
formed belief that she has no memory of having been informed that not-p, together with her 
belief in the relevant instance of truth-to-testimony conditional, to the conclusion that p” (ibid., 
p. 174-5). Since, however, there is no input from the social environment (if anything, the 
social environment affects the agent’s belief-forming process via the lack of any input to it), 
coverage-supported beliefs cannot be construed in terms of the extendedness-hypothesis. But 
then, if the reliability of coverage-supported beliefs does not depend on the reliability of any 
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input received from the agent’s social environment (as in the case of testimonial beliefs), how 
can Goldberg account for the social nature of such doxastically justified beliefs?  
 Goldberg summarizes his strategy by noting the following: “The doxastic justification 
of coverage-supported belief will depend on the doxastic justification of the subject's belief in 
the relevant truth-to-testimony conditional; and this, in turn, will depend on whether the 
subject is sensitive to the conditions under which she has relevant reliable coverage” (bid., p. 
175). Specifically, Goldberg draws our attention to the “process by which the expectations of 
the coverage-relying individual are calibrated so as to be brought in line with the prevailing 
social practices and institutions in her community (ibid., 178).  
 The problem with the above claims, however, is that, contrary to Goldberg’s aim to 
‘socialize’ the doxastic justification of coverage-supported beliefs, they actually accentuate the 
importance of the individual’s efforts to pitch her expectations about the relevant TTTC at 
the right level. In fact, Goldberg’s further remarks confirm this: “While the social institutions 
and practices I have been discussing constitute the background conditions on a subject's 
coverage-supported belief, it is the subject's sensitivity to the existence and nature of these 
institutions and practices, and her sense of what they portend in terms of the coverage that she is 
receiving, that determine the G-reliability of her coverage-supported beliefs (ibid., pp. 179-80; 
my italics). In other words, the social practices and institutions of one’s community do 
constitute the enabling (background) conditions that may allow one to form expectations of 
coverage-reliability and thereby coverage-supported beliefs. But even though such conditions 
are necessary for the subject to be able to form any coverage-supported beliefs whatsoever, the 
very G-reliability (i.e., doxastic justification) of her coverage-supported beliefs depends on her 
ability to form the right coverage expectations and thereby on herself, alone.  
 Clearly, however, this is not the requisite result of ‘socializing’ the reliability of 
coverage-supported beliefs. One would, therefore, expect Goldberg to have an ace up his 
sleeve that could help him turn the tables somehow. Curiously, however, the only move he 
makes is to offer the following remarks: 
 
Two different coverage-relying subjects, as alike skin-in as any two distinct individuals can be, 
might nevertheless differ in the G-reliability of their respective coverage-supported beliefs, as 
one subject lives in a community in which these institutions and practices provide her with 
highly reliable coverage on the issue at hand, whereas the other lives in a community where 
the coverage is less highly reliable (and where there are more issues of interest to her that are 
not covered). Whatever difference there is in the G-reliability of their respective beliefs 
supervenes on more than what is going on in their respective heads: it also supervenes on the 
social practices and institutions that surround them. 
 
Above, I say ‘curiously’, because, given Goldberg’s previous remarks (1) that a process is G-
reliable if it is reliable in the environment it is standardly employed and (2) that the G-reliability 
of coverage-supported beliefs is a matter of the subject’s sensitivity to the nature and existence 
of the relevant institutions and social practices, one would have expected Goldberg to have 
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presented a story that is substantially different from the one provided above. Specifically, for 
any two different coverage-relying subjects, who are as alike skin-in as any two distinct 
individuals can be, but who live in communities with different social practices and institutions, 
if they both are to be G-reliable in their respective coverage-supported beliefs at all, they must differ 
internally in one crucial respect: They must have different expectations about their 
communities and thereby relevant TTTCs.25 Accordingly, for any given domain of beliefs, 
and for any two individuals who are both G-reliable in their coverage-supported beliefs in 
general, any belief p (under the given domain) must be equally coverage-supported G-
reliable—that is, G-reliable simpliciter (see also fn. 25)—for both of them, because they are both 
in a position to hold some appropriately pitched TTTCs with respect to the relevant domain. 
Otherwise, if the two individuals differ with respect to their doxastic justification with respect 
to p, it will be because one of them does not even hold a coverage-supported belief in p, 
because her community does not even provide the necessary background conditions in order 
for her to form (on the basis of some appropriately-pitched TTTC) such a doxastically 
justified (i.e., G-reliable) coverage-supported belief in p. In any case, however, the G-reliability 
of their respective coverage-supported beliefs—if any—supervenes only on their internal 
goings-on. Specifically, their respective communities provide only the necessary structure for 
the two individuals to be in a position to merely form coverage-supported beliefs in the first 
place—G- or not-G-reliable alike. But whether any of these beliefs will end up being G-
reliable indeed is a whole other issue, which depends solely on whether the individuals have 
managed to calibrate their expectations to the relevant TTTCs appropriately.    
 Accordingly, even though Goldberg’s analysis demonstrates that the existence of 
coverage-supported beliefs would be impossible in the absence of one’s social environment, it 
fails to reveal the epistemically social nature of such beliefs on the basis of process reliabilism, 
as it falls short of making the case for the social nature of the doxastic justification (i.e., G-
reliability) of coverage-supported beliefs. Nevertheless, there might be an alternative, easier 
way to account for the epistemically social nature of coverage-supported beliefs on the basis of 
CAK.  
 Specifically, drawing on the above discussion, it is obvious that, in cases of coverage 
support, believing the truth (i.e., believing that p when p is the case) is due to the agent’s 
cognitive abilities: It is because of her abilities to calibrate with the relevant informational 
channels, recall that she has not encountered a report of not-p in the past, and draw the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Another way to put the same point is to note that, in the above quoted passage, Goldberg’s talk of the G-
reliability of coverage-supported beliefs as being a matter of degree is not consistent with the rest of his analysis. 
For one thing, TTTCs can be either true or false; accordingly, coverage-supported beliefs can be either G-reliable 
or not-G-reliable—and not more or less G-reliable. Accordingly, with respect to any two very similar individuals 
that inhabit communities with different social practices and for any given domain of beliefs, the two individuals will 
either both be coverage-supported G-reliable in their respective, relevant beliefs at all—but they will possess 
different relevant TTTCs—or they will both have the same TTTCs, but at least one of them will be coverage 
supported G-unreliable in her respective, relevant beliefs.   
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relevant inference on some appropriately pitched TTTC, that she comes to believe the truth 
with respect to p. Undoubtedly then, the agent’s cognitive success will at least be significantly 
creditable to her cognitive agency. Therefore, according to COGAweak, a subject can gain 
knowledge on the basis of coverage support. At the same time, however, given that in order 
for the individual to be in a position to draw inferences on the basis of relevant TTTCs, such 
that coverage supported beliefs can even be part of her doxastic repertoire, the relevant relied-
upon source must be in place, part of the credit for the agent’s cognitive success must also go 
to the relevant aspects of her community.  
Of course, it may be objected here that, by analogy of reasoning, in cases of 
knowledge on the basis of, say, vision, we should give credit to light (and so on and so forth to 
every environmental factor that makes the rest of our beliefs possible). There is a crucial 
difference, however, between this sort of natural causal contribution and the effect of one’s 
community in cases of coverage support; a difference that has to do with the fact that credit 
attributions have been traditionally associated with intentional agents. Accordingly, even 
though several extra-organismic factors may contribute causally in almost every case of belief-
formation, credit for the resulting true beliefs should only be directed to those factors that, 
somehow, contribute intentionally. And since in the case of coverage support, the relied-upon 
source clearly intends to report information on matters that it is being relied upon, part of the 
credit can plausibly, and quite intuitively, be directed to it. 
In other words, given (1) it is clear that one’s epistemic community does contribute 
causally and intentionally to the acquisition of coverage-supported true beliefs—even if only as a 
background, enabling condition and not by ensuring that the subject gets to the truth of the 
matter—and given (2) we also have a strong intuition that, in such cases, the individual subject 
does not deserve the entirety of the credit for her true belief, the remaining part of the credit 
for the ensuing cognitive success should be directed to the relevant relied-upon source.  
 Accordingly, if the epistemic phenomenon that Goldberg has unearthed obtains—
and indeed it appears that it does—we can here finish the job that Goldberg’s attachment to 
process reliabilism appears to prevent him from running to completion. Specifically, if instead 
of process reliabilism we here follow CAK—according to which knowledge is understood as 
creditable true belief—and given that the credit for any cognitive success resulting from 
coverage support must be attributed to both the individual and the community she is relying 
upon, we can successfully claim that coverage-supported true beliefs constitute another 
important fragment of our everyday knowledge, which is both social and individual in nature.       
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4. THE DUAL NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE ON THE BASIS OF EPISTEMIC 
ARTIFACTS 
When unpacked in terms of CAK, testimonial and coverage-supported true beliefs 
demonstrate the social nature of individualistic knowledge, as in both cases the subject’s 
success is not only creditable to her cognitive agency but also to other individual epistemic 
agents who have either offered the reliable testimonial reports that the subject rationally 
accepts as true, or have contributed to the source that allows the subject to have expectations 
of coverage and thereby coverage-supported beliefs. In this section, the aim is to demonstrate 
how CAK can go even further than these two testimony-related cases, by accommodating yet 
another type of cases that falls under the general heading of weak epistemic anti-
individualism.  
 The cases I have in mind are cases whereby the agent comes to know something on 
the basis of the operation of some epistemic artifact. Think, for example, of perceiving a chair 
through a tactile visual substitution system (TVSS),26 detecting the existence of a specific 
molecule by using a microscope, or coming to know the position of a satellite on the basis of a 
telescope. Before moving on to uncovering the social nature of this type of knowledge, 
however, we must focus on its details first, because, on closer inspection, it could turn out to 
be a particularly problematic type of knowledge for CAK—especially as motivated by virtue 
reliabilism.  
 To see why, consider that, according to the underlying ability intuition on knowledge, 
belief must be true in virtue of cognitive ability.27 In the cases we here have in mind, however, 
the agent’s true belief arises out of the interaction of his organismic cognitive abilities with the 
epistemic artifact: An interaction, during which the artifact plays an integral and particularly 
crucial role with respect to detecting the truth. To make clear how this may be so, think of a 
well-trained agent, whose telescope has been recently broken. Even though the agent may still 
be able to form many relevant beliefs (if, say, he still wants to take his chances), none of them 
will be non-accidentally true, no matter how much he tries. By contrast, think of another 
agent in possession of a properly working telescope. In this case, not only will the agent be 
able to form pertinent beliefs, but, unlike the first agent, his beliefs will also come out 
systematically true. Therefore, it seems that, in such cases, the epistemic artifact is a crucial 
factor in one’s cognitive success that explains not why the agent merely possesses relevant 
beliefs but why his beliefs come out true.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See (Bach-y-Rita & Kercel, 2003). Briefly, tactile visual substitution systems consist of a mini video camera that 
collects visual input, which is then converted into tactile stimulation on the back, tongue or forehead of (usually 
blind) subjects.  On the basis of their practical understanding of sensorimotor contingencies (Noe 2004), subjects 
can then interact with the device by moving around, which allows them to perceive shapes and objects and orient 
themselves in space.  
27 Remember that, according to Greco (1999, 2003, 2010), “in virtue of” is supposed to be understood in causal 
explanatory terms.  
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 To be clear, this is not to claim that one’s internal processes are not a significant 
factor in how one forms one’s beliefs. The factor, however, that seems to explain how one 
believes the truth of the matter is the artifact. Accordingly, in order to hold fast to the ability 
intuition on knowledge, virtue reliabilists must find a way to account for the artifact as being 
part of the agent’s cognitive character.28 No doubt, this sounds like a counterintuitive or even 
intractable demand that can put virtue reliabilists in a particularly awkward position. 
Nevertheless, there may actually be a promising way to meet this challenge by invoking the 
hypothesis of extended cognition. 
 According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, “the actual local operations that 
realize certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feedforward 
and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and 
world (Clark, 2007, sec. 2). Cognitive processing, in other words, can, and under the 
appropriate conditions, literally extends to the agent’s surrounding environment. Think about 
solving a mathematical problem by using pen and paper. According to the hypothesis of 
extended cognition, the involved artifacts are proper parts of the ongoing cognitive 
processing.  
In fact, it has been previously argued that virtue reliabilism in general and COGAweak  
in particular are apt for an interpretation along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of 
extended cognition (Pritchard, 2010a; Palermos, 2011, Palermos, 2014a). First of all, as the 
reasoning goes, there is nothing in the formulation of COGAweak that restricts knowledge-
conducive cognitive abilities to processes within the agent’s head. To the contrary, the idea of 
a cognitive character that may consist of “acquired methods of inquiry including those 
involving highly specialized training or even advanced technology”(Greco, 1999, p. 287) 
seems to be compatible with or even prefigure the hypothesis of extended cognition (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998, Clark, 2007, 2008; but also see Palermos, 2014b).29  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 To preempt a possible worry here, it is important to note that, in cases of testimony, one cannot really advance a 
similar argument to the effect that, according to CAK, the speaker must be part of the hearer’s cognitive character. 
In contrast to cases of employing an artifact, in cases of testimony, one’s internal capacities are a crucial factor in 
detecting the truth: It is one’s internal capacities that explain how the hearer detects an appropriate informant and 
rationally accepts the offered report, thereby ending up with the truth of the matter . Of course, if we imagine a 
parallel to the broken artifact case above, say a case where the hearer is in a testimonially unfriendly environment, 
such that almost everyone around is a compulsive liar, it will indeed be very difficult for the hearer to gain any true 
beliefs. But if she somehow comes to eventually believe the truth on the basis of a speaker, this does not mean that 
her cognitive success is not down to her internal cognitive capacities; all the more so for having managed to detect 
the only person that could provide her with reliable information and for having rationally accepted their words, 
despite the epistemically hostile setting she finds herself in. In contrast to cases of employing epistemic artifacts, 
therefore, in cases of testimony, virtue reliabilists do not need to claim that the speaker must be part of the hearer’s 
cognitive character, because, in cases of testimony, it is solely the hearer’s internal capacities that explain how the 
hearer detects the truth.     
29 It is worth noting that the idea of cognitive extension has also been invoked (Vaesen 2011) within the literature 
in order to argue against CAK. Nevertheless, as Vaesen notes himself, his argument relies on a weak notion of 
cognitive extension that philosophers of mind would more appropriately categorize under the heading of 
‘embedded cognition’ (see also fn. 31). For responses to Vaesen’s arguments see (Kelp 2013) and Greco (2012), and 
for a rejoinder, see (Vaesen 2013). Moreover, but on a slightly different note, Green (2014) has attempted to wed 
CAK to the hypothesis of distributed cognition, according to which cognition may not only extend beyond an 
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If we focus on the details of the two theories, however, we can make a much stronger 
claim. Specifically, both theories put forward the same condition in order for a process to 
count as part of the agent’s cognitive system/character (and, thereby, by the lights of virtue 
reliabilism, as knowledge-conducive): Just as Greco claims that cognitive integration of a 
belief-forming process (be it organismically internal or external) is a matter of cooperative 
interaction with other parts of the cognitive system, so cognitive scientists have recently 
argued that in order for an artifact to count as a proper part of an agent’s cognitive system all 
that is required is that the two of them be non-linearly related on the basis of ongoing mutual 
interactions (Sutton et al., 2008; Chemero, 2009; Froese et al., 2013; Palermos, 2014b; 
Theiner et al., 2010; Tollefsen & Dale, 2012; Wegner, et al., 1985).30 Specifically, the claim is 
that in order to have an extended cognitive system—as opposed to a cognitive system that is 
merely embedded in the sense of being dependent on, but not constituted by, certain 
environmental aspects (cf. Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Rupert, 2004, 2009)—all we need is 
that the contributing parts (i.e., the relevant cognitive agents and their artifacts) interact 
continuously and reciprocally with each other.31 
 We see, then, that both virtue reliabilism and the hypothesis of extended cognition 
put forward the same criterion (viz., cooperative interaction with the rest of the agent’s 
cognitive system) in order for a process to count as integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, 
and thereby as knowledge-conducive. Accordingly, there is no principled theoretical bar 
disallowing extended belief-forming processes from counting as knowledge-conducive: An 
agent may extend his cognitive character by incorporating epistemic artifacts to it.32  
So, for example, in this way, we can explain how a subject might come to know the 
position of a satellite on the basis of a telescope, while holding fast to the idea that knowledge 
is belief that is true in virtue of cognitive ability. Even though the belief-forming process in 
virtue of which the subject believes the truth is for the most part external to his organismic 
cognitive agency, it still counts as one of his cognitive abilities as it has been appropriately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
individual’s organism but it may even be distributed between several individuals at the same time, in order to 
account for team-like epistemic achievements. 
30 Moreover, it has been elsewhere (Palermos 2011a, 2014a) argued that both theories put also forward the same 
broad, common-sense functionalist intuitions on what is required from a process to count as a cognitive ability. 
Briefly, both views state that the process must be (a) normal and reliable, (b) one of the agent’s habits/dispositions 
and (c) integrated into the rest of the agent’s cognitive character/system. 
31 To use the standard terminology from philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is very important to 
distinguish between the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC) (Rupert, 2004, 2009) and the hypothesis of 
extended cognition (HEC). Invoking what has come to be known as the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy (Adams & 
Aizawa, 2001, 2008), according to which proponents of HEC mistake a causal for a constitutive dependence between 
the agent and her artifacts, proponents of HEMC suggest that we should rather settle for the less provocative view 
that the mind is merely embedded rather than extended to its environment. As noted above, however, several 
proponents of HEC have replied that the presence of non-linear relations between the agent and her artifacts 
provides a clear criterion for distinguishing between HEC and HEMC as well as putting the ‘causal-constitution’ 
fallacy to rest. For an overview of the debate and a detailed approach to how we can distinguish between HEC and 
HEMC as well as avoid several other worries with respect to HEC (including the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry and the 
‘causal-constitution’ fallacy), see 2014b. 
32 See also (Alfano forthcominga; forthcomingb) for very interesting discussions on further potential connections 
between virtue epistemology and the extended cognition and extended mind hypotheses.  
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integrated into his cognitive character.33 Moreover, the subject satisfies COGAweak, since his 
overall cognitive success is significantly creditable to his cognitive agency (i.e., his organismic 
cognitive apparatus): It is the subject’s organismic cognitive faculties that are first and 
foremost responsible for the recruitment and sustaining of the extended belief-forming process 
(i.e., telescopic observation) in virtue of which the truth with respect to the satellite’s position is 
eventually arrived at. 
In cases like this, therefore, even though it is the external component that accounts for 
the truth-status of the agent’s belief, the agent’s cognitive agency—i.e., his organismic 
cognitive faculties—is still significantly creditable for having appropriately integrated the 
relevant external component into his cognitive system, and so the agent can, by the lights of 
COGAweak, count as knowledgeable. 
Interestingly, however, at this point, the following question may arise: Whereto 
should the rest of the credit be attributed? This is a fair worry, for as it was argued above, in 
such cases, the prevailing factor in the causal explanation of the agent’s overall cognitive 
success is the integrated, extended belief-forming process that consists of both of one’s cognitive 
agency and the epistemic artifact, operating in tandem. Accordingly, since a significant part of 
the credit has been attributed to the agent’s cognitive agency, should we attribute the rest of 
the credit to the external aspects of the relevant reliable belief-forming process? That is, 
should we attribute credit to telescopes, microscopes, computers and so on? It seems that the 
answer to these questions should be negative.  
The reason has to do with a consideration we have already alluded to in the 
discussion of credit attribution in cases of coverage-support: Even though, as Greco (2003) 
claims, credit attributions are very much akin to causal explanations, attributions of 
responsibility, praise, or merely neutral action i.e., attributions of positive, negative or merely 
neutral credit, respectively) have been traditionally associated with intentional agents. 
Therefore, to attribute credit to artifacts would be a categorical mistake. Notice, however, that 
artifacts can be defined as objects that have been intentionally made or produced for a certain 
purpose. Accordingly, the remaining credit should be attributed not to the artifacts themselves 
but to the individuals that intentionally brought the relevant extended belief-forming 
processes about. Notice further, however, that, frequently, it won’t be possible to attribute the 
rest of the credit to only one single individual, because, in most cases, a (potentially very large) 
number of individuals has contributed to the development of such reliable belief-forming 
processes, by having, for example, provided even more belief-forming (sub-) processes or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Making observations through a telescope can clearly qualify as a case of cognitive extension as it is a dynamical 
process that involves ongoing reciprocal interactions between the agent and the artifact. Moving the telescope 
around, while adjusting the lenses, generates certain effects (e.g., shapes on the lens of the telescope), whose 
feedback drives the ongoing cognitive loops along. Eventually, as the process unfolds, the coupled system of the agent 
and his telescope is able to identify—that is, see—the target satellite.  
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relevant data produced on the basis of the latter. Accordingly, many times, the remaining 
credit, i.e., the credit that is associated with the external portion of the epistemic agent’s 
extended cognitive ability, will have to spread among a large part of the agent’s epistemic 
community.34  
To make the above more intuitive, let us pause to consider the interesting example of 
the FIA Formula One Championship. The F1 season consists of a series of races, the results of 
which are combined to determine two Annual World Championships; one for the drivers and 
one for the constructors. Accordingly, the analogy to be drawn is that the drivers play the role 
of the cognitive agents and the cars that of the epistemic artifact.35 Now, what is remarkably 
to the point is the fact that, according to FIA’s rules, the credit for winning cannot be solely 
attributed to the drivers; hence the two championships. Moreover, quite reasonably, the 
points for the second championship do not go to the cars themselves, but to the constructor’s 
team that built the cars. In other words, the credit for winning does not get to be attributed 
solely to the cognitive agent that drives the car, but, also, to the team that brought his racing 
artifact (i.e., the car) about. 
Now, if we think about it, very similar considerations may apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
the case of telescopic observation. In order to come to know the position of the satellite, the 
astronomer has to rely on an extended belief-forming process that was brought about on the 
basis of knowledge of long generations of mathematicians, physicists, opticians, machinists, 
astronomers, computer scientists (depending on the kind of telescope we are talking about) 
and, in general, a series of experts whose length could go on for a while. Had the astronomer 
not been part of this epistemic community, and therefore lacked the necessary reliable belief-
forming process, he would be incapable of gaining knowledge of the target proposition.  
Overall, then, the cognitive success of coming to believe the true position of the 
satellite is to a significant degree creditable to the particular astronomer—it is he who came to 
know the target proposition by employing the necessary belief-forming process—but the rest 
of the credit must be attributed to the individuals and in general the epistemic community 
that brought about the necessary belief-forming process.  
If that’s true, however, consider how a similar description of the process of gaining 
propositional knowledge could apply within the fields of mechanics, physics, biology, 
chemistry, neuroscience and in general any discipline that involves the operation of epistemic 
artifacts. In order to come to know the truth of some proposition p, many times, epistemic 
agents have to employ reliable belief-forming processes produced by long generations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 To be clear, “epistemic community”, as it is here intended, refers only to a sum of individual epistemic agents 
and not to any entity that is over and above that sum.   
35 Driving the car then, plays the role of the overall extended belief-forming process. 
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mathematicians, engineers, experimentalists, scientists, philosophers and many other 
experts.36  
In all these cases, therefore, just as in cases of testimonial knowledge and knowledge 
by coverage support, the epistemic credit for the agent’s cognitive success must spread 
between the individual agent and the relevant parts of her epistemic community.  Before 
closing this section, however, it is perhaps worth pointing out what the difference is between 
the distribution of epistemic credit that takes place in cases of knowledge on the basis of 
epistemic artifacts and the spread of credit that occurs in the rest of the cases that the previous 
sections were dedicated on.  
The main contrast has to do with the role that the social factors play in the cognitive 
ability that the agent employs in order to detect the truth. According to CAK and virtue 
reliabilism, the agent must not only believe the truth but he must arrive at it on the basis of his 
cognitive ability.  In cases of knowledge by testimony, the agent ends up with a true belief on 
the basis of her own cognitive capacities that allow her to detect an appropriate informant and 
then rationally accept the offered report—provided the hearer deems the report reliable or at 
least not unreliable. The speaker therefore plays only a background role in how the agent 
forms a true belief, by offering a report that is in fact reliable, and which subsequently forms 
the content of the hearer’s belief. Similarly, in cases of coverage support, it is the agent’s 
internal cognitive abilities that allow her to believe the truth of the matter by appropriately 
calibrating with the relevant informational channels, recalling that she has not encountered a 
report of not-p in the past, and drawing the relevant inference on some appropriately pitched 
TTTC. Accordingly, the relevant parts of her epistemic community play again only a 
background role in how the agent forms a true belief, by making it possible for her to draw 
inferences on the basis of appropriately pitched TTTCs.  
By contrast, in cases of knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts, the relevant 
aspects of the agent’s community do not merely play a background role. Admittedly, they 
affect the agent’s cognitive success only indirectly, since the agent does not interact with the 
other individuals themselves, but only with the artifact these individuals produced. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, in such cases, the artifact plays an integral role in how the agent 
detects the truth of the matter. Put another way, in such cases, the agent does not interact 
with the relevant external components in a linear, one-way dependence in order, for instance, 
to merely access information or enable herself to draw further inferences. Instead, the agent 
detects the truth by interacting with the artifact in a mutual, non-linear way. What this means, 
according to HEC, is that, in contrast to testifiers or the channels that support coverage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For a detailed argument on how we can reveal the social nature of several aspects of scientific knowledge by 
combining virtue reliabilism with active externalism, see Palermos forthcoming. For an account of the epistemology 
of scientific artifacts from a philosopher’s of science point of view see (van Fraasen 2001, 2008). See also (Toon 
2014).  
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support, in such cases, the external component does not play just a causal but a constitutive role 
in very process that is responsible for the agent’s cognitive success. Accordingly, when the 
agent knows on the basis of epistemic artifacts that she has appropriately integrated to her 
cognitive character, the epistemic community plays a much deeper role—even if indirectly 
so—and thereby deserves a bigger part of the epistemic credit in comparison to cases of 
knowledge by testimony or coverage-support.   
So with that said, and to return to our overall argument, the upshot of this section is 
this: In all cases where the agent comes to believe truly on the basis of a belief-forming process 
that extends to some epistemic artifact, the knower is the individual, because the cognitive 
success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency for appropriately 
employing the relevant reliable belief-forming process that she has integrated into her 
cognitive character. Crucially, however, the rest, and perhaps the greatest part of the credit 
for the agent’s cognitive success will have to be attributed to the individuals, and, in general, 
to the epistemic community that brought the relevant extended belief-forming process about. 
Therefore, and since according to the CAK, as captured by virtue reliabilism, knowledge is 
creditable true belief, knowledge acquired on the basis of epistemic artifacts is yet another 
type of knowledge that is both social and individual in nature, in a rather substantial sense.  
 
5. CONCLUSION: EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE AND WEAK EPISTEMIC 
ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM 
So far, it has been argued that individual knowledge, understood in terms of creditable true 
believing, often appears to be also social in nature. In particular, it was demonstrated that 
CAK cannot only account for the partly social nature of testimonial and coverage-supported 
knowledge, but it can also reveal the social nature of knowledge arrived at via the operation of 
epistemic artifacts. Admittedly, there are probably several other types of knowledge that are 
both social and individual in nature, but the above three cases represent a particularly 
significant and diverse set of a social subject’s overall means for acquiring knowledge. 
Accordingly, and contrary to any of the previous attempts to unravel the particular ways in 
which specific types of knowledge are partly social in nature, CAK looks very promising as a 
candidate for providing a unified account of all the possible ways in which weak epistemic anti-
individualism may be instantiated. 
Specifically, despite their variegation, it was argued that what all the above cases have 
in common is that they all satisfy the following claim: The subject’s cognitive success is 
significantly creditable to her cognitive agency and thus, according to COGAweak, the individual 
can be knowledgeable. What is also true in all these cases, however, is that the rest of the 
credit must go to one or more individual members of the individual subject’s epistemic 
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community. This is so, either because those individuals offer reliable reports, form epistemic 
channels on which the subject can rely on for her coverage-supported beliefs, or have 
produced some reliable belief-forming process that the subject can integrate within her 
cognitive character so as to reliably form true beliefs. Therefore, to repeat the claim, if 
knowledge is to be understood in terms of creditable true believing and if, in all the above 
diverse cases, significant part of the credit must be attributed both to the individual subject 
and the epistemic community of which the subject is a proper part, then individual 
knowledge, in all these cases, turns out to be also social in nature, thereby clearly qualifying as 
an instance of weak epistemic anti-individualism.37    
 But does this partly social nature of knowledge suggest, as some epistemologists have 
argued, that we should stop considering the individual as the proper object of our 
epistemological inquiries? To answer this worrying question, let us briefly go through what 
Hardwig thinks concerning the following case: 
 
A knows that m 
B knows that n 
C knows (1) that A knows that m, and (2) that if m, then o 
D knows (1) that B knows that n, (2) that C knows that o, and (3) that if n and o, then p. 
 
Having the above in mind, Hardwig writes: “Suppose that this is the only way to know that p 
and, moreover, that no one who “knows” that p knows that m, n and o except by knowing that 
others know them” (1985, p. 348). If that’s the case, then we must agree that either “one can 
know without possessing the supporting evidence [for the truth of the relevant proposition] or 
accept the idea that there is knowledge that is known by the community, not by any individual 
knower” (Hardwig 1985, p. 349). In some more detail, according to Hardwig, cases such as 
the above demonstrate that knowledge and intellectual autonomy—in the sense of being self-
sufficient in possessing the necessary evidence (such as sound arguments and factual 
information) for the truth of one’s belief—should come apart. Otherwise, if the link between 
knowledge and intellectual autonomy is to be preserved then knowledge, in cases such as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 It should be noted that there is no problem with the act of epistemically grouping all these cases in such a way, 
even if, in addition to all the obvious differences of mere physical implementation between the above belief-
forming processes, they also differ in other epistemically relevant ways. For example, one epistemically relevant way 
to differentiate between the above processes is to accentuate the role that one’s society plays with respect to the 
relevant mechanisms of forming one’s belief: Specifically, given the above analysis, in cases of coverage-supported 
beliefs, one’s society plays merely the role of an enabling condition for one’s belief-forming process to exist; in cases 
of testimony, one’s society provides one with the information one ends up believing; and in cases of knowledge on 
the basis of epistemic artifacts, one’s society is the source of one’s belief-forming process itself. Similarly, another 
epistemically relevant way to differentiate between these cases is in terms of how one’s evidence is associated with 
one’s epistemic community: In coverage support, the agent relies on the community for not providing relevant 
evidence; in cases of testimony the agent relies on the society for providing him with relevant evidence; and in cases 
of instrument-mediated belief, the agent relies on the community having built some instrument, indicating that, 
occasionally, there must be relevant evidence ‘out there’ to be accessed via the target instrument. Despite all these 
possible ways to (epistemically) differentiate between these cases, however, the fact remains: In all of them, the 
agents’ cognitive successes are partly creditable to their epistemic communities, allowing them, according to CAK, 
to all qualify as clear cases of weak epistemic anti-individualism.    
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above, is not possessed by any individual alone, but by the relevant community as a whole, 
because it is that community alone that can be intellectually autonomous in possessing the 
relevant evidence.  
 Of course, the latter option is obviously problematic for mainstream epistemology 
and the methodological individualism that underlies it. Hardwig, however, assumes that the 
former option of abandoning intellectual autonomy as a prerequisite for knowledge is equally 
unpalatable for individualism and mainstream epistemology. But how so?  
 One possible answer is that Hardwig appears to implicitly rely on a popular 
internalist understanding of knowledge and justification, according to which S’s reasons for his 
true beliefs must be accessible to him by reflection alone.38 Consequently, on the basis of this, 
Hardwig also comes to believe that the epistemic agent must be intellectually autonomous and 
that, crucially, a rejection of this requirement signifies a departure from mainstream 
epistemology and the underlying methodological individualism.   
This doesn’t have to be so, however. For one, it is possible that such an interpretation 
of epistemic internalism is too strong and that not all formulations of epistemic internalism 
entail that one must be intellectually autonomous in possessing evidence for the truth of the 
relevant proposition. In other words, it is an open question whether internalism can account 
for the fact that one can have no evidence with respect to p but still know that p, simply by 
knowing that someone else knows that p.39 But even if this is impossible, we can still bring into 
question the epistemic internalism that Hardwig seems to implicitly rely upon.  
It is a happy incident, then, that virtue reliabilism in general and COGAweak in 
particular are externalist, though mainstream approaches to knowledge all the same, which 
have been proposed as alternatives to the classical internalist account. This is a happy 
incident, because COGAweak can easily accommodate Hardwig’s first and arguably rather 
intuitive conclusion that the individual is a proper epistemic agent, even though not autonomously 
so. To see how this might be, consider that, according to epistemic externalism, in order for 
one’s true beliefs to count as knowledge, they need not be backed up by reasons that one 
should in principle have introspective access to. And by so denying the demand for 
introspective access to one’s justification for one’s beliefs, epistemic externalism also makes the 
demand for intellectually autonomy appear under-motivated.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This is the standard formulation of internalism, known as accessibilism. Roughly stated: Whenever one knows 
that p, then one can become aware by reflection of one’s knowledge basis for p. For more details, see (BonJour, 
1985; Chisholm, 1977; Steup, 1999).  
39 Of course this is going to be no easy task, and its feasibility will largely depend on whether one is a reductionist 
or anti-reductionist about testimonial knowledge. While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to expand on 
this issue, on one hand, the combination of epistemic internalism and reductionism about testimonial justification is 
rather problematic, because internalism has a hard time accounting for inductive knowledge (Greco 1999). On the 
other hand, prima facie, epistemic internalism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification is a rather 
unfitting match. See also fn. 40.     
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COGAweak, however, takes these considerations a step further. In particular, by 
allowing knowledge to be acquired merely on the basis of reliable belief-forming processes, 
such that the cognitive success can only be significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency, it 
actually anticipates—if not ascertains—the denial of intellectual autonomy. Either the 
presence of the relevant input to, the enabling conditions for, or even the very existence of the 
belief-forming process itself may heavily depend on one’s epistemic community (or at least 
parts of it), and this is a fact that can be explicitly accommodated: COGAweak allows (the rest 
of the) credit to be attributed to those exogenous (or rather extra-organismic) epistemic factors 
as well. Nevertheless, at the same time, it recognizes the individual as the proper epistemic 
subject and stresses his/her importance by demanding that the cognitive success be 
significantly creditable to his/her cognitive agency.  
Overall, then, COGAweak provides a way out of Hardwig’s dilemma: The 
phenomenon of epistemic dependence does not mean that we need to abandon epistemic 
individualism by admitting that there can be knowledge that is not known by any individual 
alone, but by the relevant community as a whole. Instead, COGAweak allows mainstream 
epistemologists to embrace Hardwig’s first conclusion that one can know a proposition p—
even if not autonomously so—all the while remaining well in line with methodological 
individualism.   
It should be made clear, however, that the above is not to claim that all externalist 
epistemology points away intellectual autonomy and strong individualism (as we may call the 
view that knowledge should be fully down to the individual). Having the reasons of one’s 
justification out of one’s reach of awareness is certainly not the same as partly having those 
reasons out of one’s bodily boundaries. For one thing, there can certainly be externalist 
conditions on knowledge, which are individualistic in nature. Take for example Lackey’s 
(2007) interpretation of Greco’s (externalist) Agent Reliabilism, according to which the 
cognitive success must be primarily creditable to S’s cognitive character.  Such an account can 
clearly qualify as a form of weak individualism; and, if instead it demanded that one’s cognitive 
success be solely creditable to one’s cognitive agency, it would even qualify as a case of strong 
individualism, while being an externalist approach to knowledge all the same. Therefore, the 
internalism/externalism distinction is by no means the same as the individualism/anti-
individualism distinction. And even though internalist conditions on knowledge are likely to 
be always tied to strong individualism,40 externalist conditions appear to come in degrees, with 
the potential to occupy any available area on the continuum that the individualism/anti-
individualism distinction defines. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Perhaps, it would be more accurate to say here that internalist conditions on knowledge are likely to be tied to 
strong individualism, are they not to be transformed beyond recognition. For an extended discussion of how both access and 
mentalist (Conee and Feldman, 2001) internalism can be given an anti-individualistic reading, see (Carter & 
Palermos, forthcoming). 
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COGAweak, however—with its lenient demands on the creditability of the cognitive 
success to one’s cognitive agency—is able to account for the whole spectrum of the continuum 
defined by the individualism/anti-individualism distinction. So far, we have been liberated 
from the demand of intellectual autonomy and the concomitant ‘duopoly’ of strong and weak 
epistemic individualisms, by pointing out how, on the basis of COGAweak, knowledge can be 
creditable to both some individual and the society of which he/she is a part, thereby arguing 
for what we have here called weak epistemic anti-individualism. Of course, this leaves open the 
even more liberal possibility of strong epistemic anti-individualism, according to which certain 
instances of knowledge may be entirely social in that they may be creditable only to a group of 
people as a whole—a rather interesting dialectical possibility, which is diametrically opposite to 
strong individualism, and about which more needs to be said in the future.  
For now, however, it suffices that we have here taken the first steps towards an outline 
of how mainstream epistemology can provide a unified account of perhaps all the possible 
cases whereby our seemingly individualistic knowledge turns out to be social in nature as well: 
According to CAK, on a multitude of diverse occasions, the cognitive success of having a true 
belief turns out to be creditable not just to the relevant individual, epistemic agent but to 
his/her epistemic community as well. At the same time, however, in all these cases, the 
individual agent’s central role is also clearly acknowledged, thereby allowing for mainstream 
epistemology’s methodological individualism to be applied in such weakly anti-individualistic 
cases equally well. 
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